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Firm size, market conditions and takeover likelihood 
Abstract 
Purpose 
The firm size hypothesis²takeover likelihood (TALI) decreases with target firm size (SIZE)²has 
enjoyed little traction in the TALI modelling literature, hence, this paper seeks to redevelop this 
hypothesis while taking account of prevailing market conditions²capital liquidity and market 
performance. 
Design 
The study uses a logit framework with interaction effects, to model TALI and receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) curve analyses, to assess model performance. The analysis employs a UK sample 
of 34,661 firm-year observations drawn from 3,105 firms and 1,396 M&A deals over a 30-year period 
(1987±2016).  
Findings  
While acquirers generally seek smaller targets due to transaction cost constraints, we show that the 
documented negative relation between SIZE and TALI arises from sampling bias. Over a full sample, 
mid-sized firms are most at risk of takeovers. Additionally, market conditions moderate the SIZE±
TALI relationship, with acquirers more inclined to pursue comparatively larger targets when financing 
costs are low and market growth or sentiment is high. The results are generally robust to endogeneity. 
Research implications 
Sample truncation on the basis of SIZE, leads to empirical misspecification of the TALI±SIZE relation. 
In an unbiased sample, an inverse U-shaped specification between TALI and SIZE sufficiently models 
the underlying relation and leads to improvements in the predictive ability of TALI models. 
Originality/value 
This study advances a new firm size hypothesis which is consistent with classic M&A theories. The 
VWXG\DOVRHYLGHQFHVPDUNHWFRQGLWLRQVDVDPRGHUDWRURIWKHDFTXLUHU¶VFKRLFHRIWDUJHWSIZE. A new 
model specification which recognises the non-linear relation between TALI and SIZE and accounts for 
the moderating effect of market conditions on the SIZE-TALI relationship, leads to improvements in 
the performance of TALI prediction models.  
 
Keywords: takeover likelihood, prediction, firm size, capital liquidity, market performance 
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1.0 Introduction 
$QDVVHVVPHQWRIDILUP¶Vvulnerability to future takeovers (i.e., takeover likelihood, henceforth 
TALI) is relevant for strategic management, as well as investment purposes (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 
2001; Danbolt et al., 2016). Given the high abnormal returns that accrue to such firms (Franks and 
Harris, 1989; Danbolt, 2004), a potentially lucrative investment strategy can be developed around 
takeover target prediction (Powell, 2001). Prior research has examined the factors that drive TALI and 
the extent to which these factors can be used to predict future takeover targets (see, for example, 
Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Powell, 1997, 2001; Powell and Yawson, 2007; 
Danbolt et al., 2016; Tunyi and Ntim, 2016). The evidence suggests that takeover targets are 
inefficiently managed, relatively undervalued, comparatively smaller (than acquirers), suffer from a 
mismatch between growth opportunities and resources, are young, have substantial tangible property 
and are likely to hail from ³disturbed´ industries (see, for, example, Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; 
Powell and Yawson, 2007 and Cremers et al., 2009). Notwithstanding, these studies concede that 
further research into the determinants of TALI is warranted as current prediction models have low 
predictive abilities and high levels of misclassification. Powell and Yawson (2007), for example, 
attribute the low predictive power of current prediction models to their finding that frequently adopted 
takeover prediction hypotheses explain other restructuring events such as bankruptcies, divestitures 
and employee layoffs. This study aligns with this literature.  
Specifically, this study is motivated by the lack of consistent empirical support for one of the 
key hypotheses for takeover prediction²the firm size hypothesis. The hypothesis as put forward by 
Palepu (1986), and widely adopted across the takeover prediction literature (see, for example, Ambrose 
and Megginson, 1992; Powell, 1997, 2001, 2004; Powell and Yawson, 2007; Gorton et al., 2009; 
Cremers et al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016; Tunyi and Ntim, 2016), argues that TALI is decreasing with 
target firm size (henceforth, SIZE) i.e., small (large) firms are more (less) vulnerable to takeover bids. 
The rationale is that several size-related transaction costs are associated with acquiring a target and, 
therefore, the number of viable acquirers for a target decreases as its size increases. These costs can 
include the market price plus a premium for the target, M&A negotiation fees (adviser, consultants 
and investment banks, amongst others) and the cost of absorbing the target into the acquirer¶VRSHUDWLQJ
framework (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001; Danbolt et al., 2016). In this paper, this is referred to as the 
³DIIRUGDELOLW\´DUJXPHQW6HYHUDOVWXGLHV, VWDUWLQJZLWK3DOHSX¶VVHPLQDOVWXG\3DOHSXKDYH
tested the firm size hypothesis, with only a few (e.g., Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; 
Brar et al., 2009) finding any empirical support. Other studies including Barnes (1999), Powell (1997, 
2001, 2004), and more recently, Danbolt et al., (2016) and Tunyi and Ntim (2016) have tested this 
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hypothesis in different settings and found evidence of the contrary, i.e., TALI increases with SIZE. The 
present study, therefore, seeks to unpack this conundrum and redevelop a new firm size hypothesis by 
exploring the possibility of a non-linear TALI±SIZE relationship in isolation, as well as exploring how 
prevailing market conditions inform the acquirer¶VFKRLFHRIDVXLWDEOHSIZE.  
We advance three testable hypotheses explaining the relation between target firm size, market 
condition and TALI. These are discussed in detail in section 2.0. In summary, we first hypothesise (H1) 
that TALI is an inverse U-shaped function of SIZE, with mid-size firms most vulnerable to takeovers 
(when compared to their small and large counterparts). Our argument is that acquirers prefer 
comparatively larger targets, subject to transaction costs constraints. H1 is consistent with several 
M&A theories including economies of scale, managerial hubris, managerial utility maximisation, 
empire-building, information asymmetry, and transaction costs. Specifically, we argue that managers 
seeking to achieve economies of scale, market power or, indeed, personal benefits (empire building, 
managerial utility maximisation) through M&As will be attracted to larger rather than smaller targets. 
Nonetheless, anti-trust regulation, high transaction costs and capital requirements will shield the 
largest firms from takeover activity. Our second (H2) and third (H3) hypotheses support H1 by 
exploring how market conditions, specifically capital liquidity (i.e., the cost of finance or prevailing 
interest rates) and stock market growth (as a measure of market sentiment), potentially inform the 
acquirer¶VFKRLFHRISIZE. Acquirers may respond to improvements in market conditions by pursuing 
growth through organic channels (i.e., internal growth) or inorganic channels (external growth such as 
through M&As). Contingent on the choice of inorganic growth, the acquirer can achieve growth 
through the acquisition of (1) several small firms, or alternatively, (2) a single large firm. Drawing 
from multiple perspectives (e.g., economies of scale, managerial hubris, managerial utility 
maximisation, empire-building, information asymmetry and transaction costs), we hypothesise (H2) 
that comparatively larger targets will be acquired in periods of high capital liquidity. Our third 
hypothesis is related to the second (H2), but explores the impact of aggregate market growth (a 
measure of market sentiment, see Danbolt et al., 2016) on the acquirerV¶FKRLFHRIWDUJHWILUPVL]HWe 
hypothesise (H3) that market growth (and hence positive market sentiment) incentivises acquirers to 
pursue comparatively larger targets.  
To our knowledge, H1 is unique to our study. Prior studies generally argue that takeover 
likelihood declines with firm size (the firm size hypothesis) but find limited support for this hypothesis 
(Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997; Danbolt et al., 2016; Tunyi et al., 2019). H2 and H3 build on prior studies 
(including Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Harford, 2005 and Dong et al., 
2006) exploring how market conditions drive aggregate levels of M&As (i.e., merger waves). We 
extend this literature by exploring how market conditions impact on the acquirerV¶FKRLFHRIVXLWDEOH
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targets (with a unique focus on SIZE). Finally, we explore whether we can partly address the 
misclassification problem in TALI prediction models (Powell, 1997; 2001; 2004; Powell and Yawson, 
2007 and Danbolt et al., 2016), by accounting for the three relationships discussed in H1-H3. Our 
empirical analysis is based on a UK sample of 34,661 firm-year observations drawn from 3,105 unique 
firms and 1,396 M&A deals over a 30-year period (1987-2016).  
Our study makes two main contributions to the literature. First, we develop a new firm size 
hypothesis which better explains the relationship between DILUP¶VVL]H and exposure to takeovers. To 
our knowledge, this is the first study to explain the lack of empirical support for the firm size 
hypothesis (Palepu, 1986, Danbolt et al., 2016). We find that, on average, acquirers tend to pursue 
comparatively larger targets subject to transaction cost constraints. Hence, mid-size firms tend to have 
comparatively higher TALI compared to their small and large counterparts. The largest firms are 
shielded from takeovers due to transaction costs constraints. The smallest firms are unattractive as 
targets as they, perhaps, do not allow the acquirer to address some of the motivations (e.g., economies 
of scale, managerial hubris, managerial utility maximisation and empire-building) or challenges (e.g., 
information asymmetry) of M&As. In support of this finding, we provide evidence on the impact of 
market conditions on the choice of SIZE. This part of our study aligns with the literature exploring 
how market conditions shape acquirerV¶FKRLFHVParticularly, we extend prior studies on merger waves 
(Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008 and Gorton et al., 2009)2, by showing that, ceteris paribus, acquirers tend to acquire 
comparatively larger targets in periods of high capital liquidity and market growth (or positive market 
sentiment). 
Finally, in response to Powell (1997, 2001, 2004), Powell and Yawson (2007) and Danbolt et al. 
(2016), we show that the out-of-sample predictive ability of TALI models can be improved by re-
specifying the SIZE±TALI relationship and including other relevant explanatory variables, specifically 
measures of capital liquidity and market growth, in existing TALI prediction models.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; section 2.0 discusses the hypotheses, section 3.0 
discusses the data and methodology, section 4.0 discusses the empirical results and section 5.0 presents 
concluding remarks. 
 
                                                 
2 This literature suggests that takeovers are most likely to occur in periods of economic recovery, coinciding with rapid credit expansion, 
burgeoning external capital markets and stock market booms. 
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2.0 Hypothesis development 
The firm size hypothesis (Palepu, 1986; Powell and Yawson, 2007; Danbolt et al., 2016) hinges 
on an ³affordability´ argument; comparatively smaller firms are easier to acquire due to lower implied 
acquisition costs. In the context of TALI modelling, this implicitly assumes some knowledge of the 
characteristics of the acquirer. Nonetheless, to mitigate look-ahead bias, a ILUP¶VTALI is generally 
modelled a priori, i.e., with no knowledge of the identity or characteristics of the potential acquirer 
(Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997, 2001, 2004; Powell and Yawson, 2007, Danbolt et al., 2016; Tunyi et 
al., 2019)3DOHSX¶V³affordability´ argument (proxied by firm size) is, perhaps, supported if 
TALI of a firm (e.g., firm i) increases with Ȗ the number of firms larger than firm i. This will imply 
that the smallest firms in the population face tremendous takeover threat, and, in time, will be absorbed 
by larger firms. By extension, over sufficient time, only large firms will continue to exist. Indeed, such 
DSRVLWLRQRI³HDWRUEHHDWHQ´LVSRVWXODWHGE\*RUWRQHWDODQGVRPHHPSLULFal evidence on 
defensive takeovers in the US banking industry is provided in Louis (2004). Nonetheless, if 3DOHSX¶V 
argument is supported, an unbiased proxy for affordability should, perhaps, EHȖDQGQRWWKHVL]HRI
firm i+HUHȖVKRXOGEHSRVLWLYHO\related to TALI across the population, as the smallest firms have 
WKH ODUJHVW Ȗ DQG YLFH YHUVD &RQVLGHULQJ WKH XQLYHUVH RI SRWHQWLDO acquirers, it is empirically 
FKDOOHQJLQJWRHVWLPDWHȖIRUHDFKILUP  
Firm size (as a proxy for affordability) is, perhaps, mainly consistent with an antitrust avoidance 
motive and a variable cost minimisation motive of takeovers but inconsistent with other established 
theories and motives of takeovers such as economies of scale, managerial hubris, market power, 
empire-building and transaction costs (Mueller, 1969; Roll, 1986; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997 and 
Kosnik and Shapiro, 1997). While the smallest firms in the population are the easiest to acquire (due 
to low capital requirement), their acquisition is unlikely to allow bidding managers to attain typical 
acquisition motives (e.g., economies of scale, managerial hubris, market power, empire-building). 
While bidding firms are likely to pursue targets that are comparatively smaller in size for transaction 
costs reasons (Palepu, 1996; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Powell, 1997 and Gorton et al., 2009), 
the creation of value by the acquirer through increased synergies and economies of scale/scope (Tirole, 
1988) is, potentially, dependent on the size of the target. Similarly, acquirers seeking to generate 
market power, acquire undervalued firms (firm undervaluation hypothesis; Palepu, 1986) or 
FRQVROLGDWHWKHLU³HPSLUHV´ (empire-building theory; Mueller, 1969), are more likely to achieve such 
motives through the acquisition of larger rather than smaller targets. If managers are overconfident in 
their managerial ability, as evident by the tendency to overpay for targets (Roll, 1986; Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997), given a choice of several targets, they are similarly more likely to pursue larger 
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rather than smaller targets. These extant M&A theories therefore suggest that comparatively larger 
targets are more attractive to acquirers. 
A counter argument which breaks down the above logic is that acquirers may alternatively 
achieve these motives of M&As (i.e., economies of scale, managerial hubris, market power, empire-
building) by acquiring and consolidating multiple small targets. Clearly, this is not observed in 
practice, perhaps, due to transaction costs involved in making multiple acquisitions. Specifically, 
transaction cost savings can be achieved by acquiring a single large firm (subject to resource 
constraints) rather than multiple small firms, due to fixed costs (e.g., search costs, due diligence, 
FRQVXOWDQWV¶ IHHV management time and integration costs etc.) associated with M&A transactions 
(Kosnik and Shapiro, 1997). Hence, if ³bigger is better´ to acquirer managers, WKHQD ILUP¶VTALI 
should generally increase with SIZE. Notwithstanding, high transaction costs, resource constraints and 
the limited number of comparatively larger firms (i.e., Ȗ can play an important role in shielding the 
largest firms from takeover threats. )XUWKHUUHJXODWRU\DXWKRULWLHVHJWKH8.¶V&RPSHWLWLRQVDQG
Markets Authority) are more likely to scrutinise deals involving the consolidation of the largest firms 
on competition grounds. This suggests the existence of an inverse U-shaped relation between a firm¶V 
size (SIZE) and TALI. The hypothesis is stated as follows; 
 
H1: Given a representative sample of firms, takeover likelihood (TALI) increases with target 
firm size (SIZE) for small firms but declines with SIZE for large firms. 
 
H1, if supported, will explain the results from prior studies²TALI is declining in firm size² as 
several prior studies limit their samples to large firms. For example, the Brar et al. (2009) study, which 
finds support for the firm size hypothesis, only covers firms with market capitalisation of at least 
$100m. This result, while biased towards large firms, is consistent with H1, i.e., for large firms, there 
is a negative relation between TALI and SIZE.  
The new firm size hypothesis is supported by exploring the effect of prevailing market conditions 
(particularly capital liquidity and stock market performance or market growth) on the acquirer¶VFKRLFH
of target size. Capital liquidity²a measure of the availability, ease or cost of obtaining investment 
capital²appears to play a role in stimulating takeover activity. M&A transactions are generally high 
capital investments. Prior empirical evidence suggests that a high proportion of M&A transactions 
involve the use of cash (Danbolt, 2004 and Danbolt and Maciver, 2012). In a UK study, Danbolt 
(2004), for example, finds that over 95 percent (of 116) foreign acquirers and 30 percent (of 510) 
domestic acquirers use cash as the preferred method of payment. A high proportion of the remaining 
acquirers use cash in combination with equity and other alternatives as their preferred method of 
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payment (Danbolt, 2004). Danbolt and Maciver (2012) also show that UK acquirers have a high 
preference for cash over other methods of payment, with 44.6 percent of acquirers paying in cash, 45.4 
percent using a mixed method and only 10 percent using equity exchange. Even in circumstances 
where equity is used, acquirers will, perhaps, require substantial cash resources to successfully absorb 
the target and complete post-merger reorganisation activities (Palepu, 1986; Danbolt et al., 2016).  
Most firms are unlikely to have sufficient internally-generated cash resources to complete 
takeovers without relying on external funding either from equity or debt markets. Hence, the success 
of M&A activities is, perhaps, contingent on the availability of capital and the ease and costs at which 
capital can be obtained. This suggests that takeovers are more likely to occur in periods of high capital 
liquidity i.e., in periods when the cost of capital and prevailing interest rates are lower. Indeed, prior 
studies in the merger wave literature (e.g., Harford, 2005 and Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001) show 
that merger waves coincide with periods of high capital availability and high macro-level liquidity. 
These prior studies are, however, silent on the issue of how capital liquidity informs the size of 
acquisitions during such merger waves. Clearly, from the acquirer¶VSHUVSHFWLYHWKHFKRLFHRIWDUJHW
firm size is contingent on an acquirer¶VDELOLW\WRUDLVHILQDQFH*LYHQW\SLFDODFTXLVLWLRQPRWLYHVHJ
economies of scale, managerial hubris, market power, empire-building), we hypothesise that acquirers 
are likely to pursue relatively larger targets (since they are more affordable) in periods of high capital 
liquidity. Our second hypothesis is stated as follows; 
 
H2: Relatively larger takeover targets are more likely to be acquired in periods of high capital 
liquidity. 
 
Our final hypothesis explores another market factor²market growth²and its impact on the 
SIZE±TALI relationship. Danbolt et al. (2016) suggest that market growth captures market sentiment 
as investor outlook is more positive in periods of market growth. Perhaps market growth or sentiment, 
as a timing factor, is also critical to the decision to acquire and choice of target size (SIZE). Prior 
research suggests that acquirerV¶SURSHQVLW\ WRHQJDJHDQGFRPSOHWHPHUJHU deals increases during 
periods of high stock market valuation and economic expansion (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Harford, 2005 and Dong et al., 2006). Harford (2005), for example, argues 
that this is because economic growth increases the likelihood of merger success while Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004) and Dong et al. (2006) argue that, in the case of stock deals, such mergers are 
motivated by the acquirerV¶DWWHPSWWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIWKHLURYHUYDOXHGVWRFNVAgain, prior literature 
is silent on how market growth or sentiment informs the acquirer¶VVHOHFWLRQRID suitable target size. 
As in the case of market sentiment (H2), we similarly extend this literature by considering how market 
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growth can moderate the DFTXLUHU¶Vchoice of target size. Specifically, we contend that market growth 
(i.e., positive market sentiments) will incentivise acquirers to pursue relatively larger targets as this 
allows them to achieve classic motives of M&As (i.e., economies of scale, managerial hubris, market 
power, empire-building). Our third hypothesis is stated as follows; 
 
H3: Relatively larger takeover targets are more likely to be acquired in periods of high market 
growth. 
3.0 Data and Methodology  
Modelling TALI 
The approach to modelling TALI is consistent with Palepu et al. (1989), Cremers et al., (2009) 
and Danbolt et al., (2016). A logit regression framework is adopted, where the probability that a firm 
(i) will be acquired in any period (t) is a vector (Z) of its characteristics in the previous period (t-1). 
The base model is shown as follows:  ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ଵଵା௘షೋ೔೟షభ            (1) 
where, ௜ܲ௧ is the probability that firm i will be acquired in the current period (t) and ܼ௜௧ିଵ is a 
vector of firm i¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQWKHSUHYLRXVSHULRGt-1), given as follows: ܼ௜௧ିଵ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ଵܺ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܺଶ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ڮ ൅ ߚ௞ܺ௞௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧ିଵǡ   (2) 
In equation (1), the dependent variable ( ௜ܲ௧ሻ takes the value of one if a firm (i) is the subject of 
a takeover in a period (t), and a value of zero otherwise. In equation (2), ߚ଴ is the intercept term and ߚ௝ (j  «k) represents the coefficients associated with the corresponding independent variables ௝ܺ(j  «k) for each firm. The main independent variables in this model are measures of firm size, 
capital liquidity and market growth, and their interactions (the interaction between firm size and capital 
liquidity and the interaction between firm size and market growth). These are discussed further below.  
Following Soares and Stark (2009), we assume that most (UK) firms will only publish their 
financial result for the last year (t-1) by the end of June this year (t). This implies that any bid 
announcements made between 1st July year (t) and 30th June year (t+1) is based on financial results for 
year-end December year (t-1). This procedure is fully discussed in Soares and Stark (2009) and adopted 
in Danbolt et al. (2016). The lags imposed ensures that look-ahead bias in prediction analysis is 
mitigated, as a ILUP¶VTALI in period (t) is modelled as a function of its publicly available financial 
information in the last period (t-1). Additionally, this addresses one potential source of endogeneity²
reverse causality. 
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Independent variables 
Consistent with Powell (1997) and Powell and Yawson (2007), the natural log of total assets is 
used as a proxy of target firm size (SIZE).3 In additional tests, quintiles and quartiles are used to identify 
different SIZE subgroups. For example, mid-size firms are considered as those in quartiles 2 and 3. 
This is discussed in more detail in section 4.0. 
Consistent with Harford (2005)4, capital liquidity is first measured as the spread (iSPRD) 
between the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and the Bank of England Base Rate (BOEBR).5 A 
high spread, for example, indicates high cost of capital and, hence, low capital liquidity. Our second 
measure for capital liquidity is the change in the level of credit (from all sectors) to the non-financial 
sector (dCRDT) as a ratio of gross domestic product (GDP). Higher levels of credit (i.e., a positive 
change in the level of credit) is consistent with high capital liquidity. Consistent with Bi and Gregory 
(2011) and Danbolt et al. (2016), the performance of the FTSE All Share index is used to proxy for 
market growth or sentiment (dMKT). dMKT in each year is computed as the 12-month (ending June 
30th) return on the FTSE All Share index. 
Given that we want to explore interaction effects for logit models, as suggested by Ai and Norton 
(2003), we facilitate interpretation of our results by converting one of our interaction variables to a 
binary variable. We generate binary variables to capture capital liquidity (i.e., iSPRDdummy and 
dCRDTdummy) and market growth (i.e.,dMKTdummy). Here, iSPRDdummy takes a value of 0 if 
iSPRD reduces by at least 5 percent from one year to the next, and a value of 1 otherwise.6 Similarly, 
dCRDTdummy and dMKTdummy take values of 1 if dCRDT and dMKT, respectively, increase by at 
least 5 percent from one year to the next, and values RIRWKHUZLVH7KHXVHRID³SHUFHQW´WKUHVKROG
allows us to ignore small changes (i.e., less than 5 percent) in iSPRD, dCRDT and dMKT as such 
changes are unlikely to have a material effect on takeover activity.7 We use these binary measures of 
capital liquidity and market growth (iSPRDdummy, dCRDTdummy and dMKTdummy) in place of the 
continuous variables (iSPRD, dCRDT and dMKT) when exploring interaction effects. 
                                                 
3 In additional analysis (unreported), we find that results are robust to other measures of SIZE including market capitalisation and book 
value of equity. 
4 Harford (2005) measures capital liquidity as the spread between the commercial and industrial loan rate and the US Federal Reserve 
Funds rate. 
5 Monthly data is available from the Bank of England webpage. Rate changes from one month to another are slight.  We first compute 
the month spread, then average this over the 12 month period. 
6 This definition ensures that, consistent with our iSPRD variable, a low (0) iSPRDdummy indicates high capital liquidity, and vice versa. 
7 Our results are stronger when we use larger thresholds (e.g., 7 and 10 percent) and weaker when we do not impose a threshold. In 
robustness tests, we have also considered other methods for converting iSPRD, dCRDT and dMKT into binary variables. For example, a 
binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the variable is above the median (or mean) value and a value of 0, otherwise. In general, the 
results are qualitatively similar, although their level of significance varies. 
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Control variables 
Our analysis (H1) aims to explore the possibility of an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
SIZE and TALI. Hence, we need to also rule out the possibility that such a relationship, if it exists, is 
driven by other firm factors. The relationship between D ILUP¶V size, age and lifecycle is well 
documented outside the TALI modelling literature (Cabral and Matta, 2003; Hsieh and Klenow, 2014). 
Indeed, prior research suggests that new businesses start small but grow over time as they accumulate 
organisational capital or as the demand for their products rises (Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005). We 
explicitly control for firm lifecycle by including measures of firm lifecycle (Dickinson, 2011; Hasan 
and Cheung, 2018) as controls in the model. The derivation of these measures is explained in Table 1. 
The remaining control variables in the model include commonly employed predictors of TALI 
(see, for example, Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997; Brar et al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016) including return 
on capital employed (ROCE), average abnormal return (AAR7RELQ¶V4TBQ), sales growth (SGW), 
liquidity (LIQ), leverage (LEV), growth-resource mismatch dummy (GRD), free cash flow (FCF), 
tangible assets (TANG), firm age (AGE), the presence of large shareholders (BLOC), price momentum 
(MOM) and trading volume (TVOL). These variables, their rationale for inclusion and their full 
definitions are summarised in Table 1.  
Finally, to take account of merger waves and industry variations in M&A activity, we also 
control for year and industry fixed effects using year and (2 digit SIC code) industry dummies.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Sample and data sources 
To empirically test the hypotheses, the sample of all firms (live and dead) listed on the main 
market of the London Stock Exchange between 1987 and 2016 is identified. Financials (SIC code 60-
69) and utilities (SIC code 40-49) are excluded due to their unique reporting standards and regulations. 
A final sample of 3,105 unique firms is obtained. Accounting and stock returns data are collected from 
Thomson DataStream and M&A deal information from Thomson One. The focus is on merger deals 
(involving UK publicly listed targets) which, if completed, will give the acquirer control of the target 
(Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Danbolt et al., 2016). The sample consists of 1,396 M&A deals 
involving non-financial and non-utility firms, announced between 1st June 1987 and 30th June 2018. 
The two datasets are matched using DataStream codes and time lags are imposed based on the June 
approach (Soares and Stark, 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016).8 Outliers are eliminated from the final dataset 
by winsorising, ROCE, AAR, TBQ, SGW, LIQ, LEV, FCF, TANG, MOM, TVOL at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. No adjustments are made to dummy variables, as well as SIZE and AGE. In untabulated 
                                                 
8 In general, this approach attributes M&A deals observed in one period/year (t) to firm characteristics in the previous period/year (t-1). 
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results, alternative outlier treatments are followed (e.g., winsorising at the 5th and 95th percentile), and 
results remain qualitatively similar. The final dataset is made up of 34,661 firm-year observations 
drawn from 3,105 firms and 1,396 M&A deals over a 30-year period (1987-2016). About 30 percent 
of the M&A deals in the dataset are initiated by cross-border acquirers from 48 distinct countries. A 
majority of cross-border deals (10 percent) involve US acquirers. The results of the hypotheses tests 
are discussed in the next section. 
 
4.0 Results and Discussion 
Acquirers seek comparatively smaller targets 
To partly support our argument that transaction cost constraints push acquirers to seek 
comparatively smaller targets, we first compare the size of acquirers to the size of their corresponding 
targets using two different measures of size; market capitalisation and total assets. This analysis covers 
all M&A deals involving UK firms. We present the median of measures of relative (acquirer as a ratio 
of target) size in Table 2.9 Additionally, we explore whether the difference in the sizes of acquirers 
and targets is robust to deal characteristics (i.e., method of payments, origin of the acquirer, attitude of 
the acquirer, deal completion and acquirer public status). 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
The results support the arguments of Palepu (1986) and Gorton et al. (2009), confirming that 
targets are, on average, smaller when compared to acquirers. In general, the average (median) acquirer 
is about 3 (4) times larger than the average (median) target. In terms of relative size of acquirer to 
target, the median acquirer has about 2.5 times the market capitalisation of its target. This increases 
significantly for certain deal types such as cash and cross-border deals. Cash and cross-border acquirers 
are about 6.5 and 5.1 times (respectively) larger than their targets. This relationship is consistent across 
different subsamples (i.e., public versus private acquirers, friendly versus hostile acquirers and 
completed versus failed deals), as well as different measures of firm size (i.e., total assets and market 
capitalisation). Overall, tKLV VXJJHVWV WKDW µDIIRUGDELOLW\¶ SOD\V DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ WKH acquirer¶s 
choice of a suitable target. This finding, however, does not necessitate a negative relation between 
SIZE and TALI as commonly hypothesised (see, Palepu, 1986; Barnes 1999; Powell, 2001; Powell, 
2004; Powell and Yawson, 2007; Brar et al., 2009). Indeed, as will be shown (model 1, Table 3), when 
the full sample of firms is considered, consistent with the results in Powell and Yawson (2007), TALI 
appears to have a positive relation with SIZE. This study sheds light on this conundrum.  
                                                 
9 In untabulated analysis, we conduct t-tests and median tests to explore statistical significance of the differences in sizes of acquirers 
and targets. In all cases we find this difference to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Mid-sized firms are more vulnerable to acquisitions 
The first hypothesis (H1) argues that TALI initially increases with target firm size (i.e., SIZE) but 
declines after a certain size threshold is attained. That is, mid-size firms are most at risk of takeovers. 
A multivariate framework is used to explore the relation between SIZE and TALI by estimating logistic 
regressions (i.e., equations 1 and 2). In untabulated analyses, Pearson and Spearman correlations, as 
well as variance inflation factors, are first estimated to check for multicollinearity issues. The results 
show that the level of correlations among the independent variables is modest and unlikely to lead to 
multicollinearity concerns.10 Next, as in Table 3, different logistic regression models for TALI are 
estimated, with SIZE as the main predictor variable, while controlling for other drivers of TALI (noted 
in Table 1). The models also control for (2 digit SIC code) industry and year fixed effects. For brevity, 
we present marginal effects only. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Model 1 uses SIZE as the main predictor variable and controls for different determinants of TALI. 
The results show that, when the full population of UK firms is considered, TALI generally increases 
with firm size (p-value of 0.002). To put the results into economic perspective, a unit increase in SIZE 
FRUUHVSRQGVWRDSHUFHQWDJHSRLQWVLQFUHDVHLQDILUP¶VDFTXLVLWLRQOLNHOLKRRGThese results, while 
counterintuitive, are consistent with Powell and Yawson (2007). They are also consistent with Danbolt 
et al. (2016) who find that SIZE is positively related to TALI, although their results are not statistically 
significant (p-value of 0.181). To shed further light, this relation is explored within different SIZE 
quintiles11.  
In models 2 to 6, we run the analysis for firms in different SIZE quintiles or subsamples (Q1 to 
Q5). The results show that TALI increases with SIZE for firms in Q1 (p-value of 0.000). The relation 
between TALI and SIZE is still positive and significant for firms in Q2 (p-value of 0.000). This relation 
reverts and becomes negative in the case of Q3 (p-value of 0.683). For Q4 and Q5, TALI is negatively 
related to SIZE. The relation for Q4 (Q5) is significant at the 10 (1) percent level.12 In economic terms, 
a one unit increase in SIZE leads to a 2 (2.7) percentage points increase in TALI for firms in Q1 (Q2). 
On the contrary, the same one unit increase in SIZE leads to a 1.4 (1.2) percentage points decrease in 
TALI for firms in Q4 (Q5). The marginal effect for Q3 is small (-0.003), suggesting a weak relationship 
between SIZE and TALI for firms in Q3. Overall, the results show that TALI increases with SIZE for 
small firms (Q1 and Q2) but decreases with SIZE for larger firms (Q4 and Q5). (We again confirm this 
                                                 
10 The variance inflation factors are also under 2 in all cases. These results are available on request. 
11 These quintiles are generated by ranking firms by their total assets in each year and creating five (5) equal groups of firms based on 
their sizes. 
12 In robustness checks, we find that the results are consistent when we use of quartiles in place of quintiles. 
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directly in models 1 and 2 of Table 4.) By extension, if the above results are robust, we should find 
that the smallest (Q1) and largest (Q5) firms in the population are least vulnerable to takeovers. We 
test this directly, by exploring whether membership in Q1 DQG4UHODWLYHWR4UHGXFHVDILUP¶V
vulnerability to takeovers (Table 3, model 7). Indeed, we find that this is the case; as in model 7, 
membership in Q1 and Q5 reduces TALI by 4.5 and 1.1 percentage points respectively. In essence, the 
results suggest that, within a sample of small firms, the largest firms are most vulnerable to takeovers. 
On the contrary, within a sample of large firms, the smallest firms are most vulnerable to takeovers. 
The latter finding is consistent with Brar et al. (2009) who find support for the firm size hypothesis in 
a sample of large European firms. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
We turn our attention to empirically establishing the nature of the relationship between SIZE and 
TALI. Since we hypothesise (H1) an inverse U-shaped relationship, we expect that, ceteris paribus, 
mid-size firms should have the highest TALI. :HGHILQH³PLG-VL]HILUPV´DVILUPVLQ(1) SIZE quartiles 
2 and 3, (2) SIZE quintiles 2, 3, and 4 and (3) SIZE quintile 3. We use an indicator variable (MSDY) to 
identify mid-size firms.13  Model 3 of Table 4, tests the relation between MSDY (membership in SIZE 
quartiles 2 and 3) and TALI. The results suggest that mid-size firms have a higher TALI than their small 
(quartile 1) and large (quartile 4) counterparts. Taken together, this suggests an inverse U-shaped 
relation between SIZE and TALI with mid-sized firms most at risk of takeovers, when compared to 
their small and large counterparts. The next analyses (models 4 and 5), focus on modelling this non-
linear relation by adding a squared term²firm size squared (SIZEsq)²to the model. In model 5, SIZE 
and SIZEsq are centred about their means. The results show that TALI has a positive (and significant) 
relation with SIZE (p-value of 0.000) and a negative (and significant) relation with SIZEsq (p-value of 
0.000). 
Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with the first hypothesis. That is, the results 
show that, given a representative sample of firms, TALI initially increases with SIZE and later declines 
as SIZE exceeds some threshold. In other words, mid-size firms are more vulnerable to takeovers when 
compared to their small and large counterparts. Our results do not support 3DOHSX¶VDUJXPHQW
that SIZE and TALI are negatively related, at least in a UK sample. The evidence suggests that prior 
VWXGLHV VXFK DV %UDU HW DO  DFKLHYHG HPSLULFDO UHVXOWV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 3DOHSX¶V SURSRVLWLon, 
perhaps, due to sample selection bias, i.e., their sample is biased towards large firms. This issue is 
further confirmed in subsequent analyses. Finally, this non-linear relation can be easily captured by 
                                                 
13
 The mid-size dummy (MSDY) takes a value of 1 for all firms in (1) SIZE quartiles 2 and 3, (2) SIZE quintiles 2, 3, and 4 and (3) SIZE 
quintile 3, and a value of 0, otherwise (i.e., for all firms in quartiles 1 and 4). The results are robust to the three definitions [(1) to (3)] of 
MSDY. We present results for (1) in Table 4. 
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including a squared term for SIZE in the model. The performance of this augmented model is also 
assessed later in this study 
 
Larger firms are acquired in good market conditions 
H2 and H3 suggest that acquisitions targeting larger firms (targets) are more likely to be pursued 
in periods of good market conditions i.e., high capital liquidity (H2) and high market growth (H3). We 
test H2 by exploring the interaction effect of capital liquidity (iSPRD, dCRDT) and market growth 
(dMKT) on the SIZE ±TALI relationship. Table 5 presents marginal effects of a logit model with TALI 
as the binary dependent variable, measures of market conditions as the independent variable and a 
comprehensive set of control variables. As shown in models 1 and 2 of Table 5, we first establish that 
TALI increases with capital liquidity (iSPRD, dCRDT)14 and market growth (dMKT), after controlling 
for several firm characteristics (as shown in Table 1) and also for industry and year fixed effects. In 
economic terms, a unit increase in iSPRD (dCRDT) is associated with a 0.5 (16.7) percentage points 
decline (increase) in TALI. Similarly, a unit increase in dMKT leads to a 4.6 percentage points increase 
in TALI. These results are significant at the 5 percent level. The results complement prior studies on 
drivers of merger waves (Harford, 2005 and Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001), by showing that 
increases in capital liquidity and market performance coincide with an increase in firm-level TALI. 
Next, using binary versions of our key variables, we explore whether capital liquidity and market 
growth moderate the SIZE±TALI relation using interaction effects. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
In Table 5, models 4 to 6, we explore H2 and H3 directly by interacting (1) iSPRDdummy and 
SIZE, (2) dCRDTdummy and SIZE, and (3) dMKTdummy and SIZE. Consistent with our hypotheses, 
we find that capital liquidity (model 5) and market growth (model 6) moderate the SIZE±TALI 
relationship. In economic terms, a unit increase in SIZE leads to an additional 0.3 percentage point 
increase in TALI in periods of good market conditions (i.e., high capital liquidity and market growth) 
as opposed to poor market conditions. The results are significant at the 5 percent level. The results 
suggest that, other things being equal, larger targets are selected when cheaper financing is available 
(high capital liquidity; iSPRDdummy=0, dCRDTdummy=1) but comparatively smaller targets are 
selected when financing costs are high (low capital liquidity; iSPRDdummy=1 dCRDTdummy=0). 
Similarly, the results suggest that larger firms are more likely to be acquired in periods of high market 
growth (dMKTdummy=1). These results support our second (H2) and third (H3) hypotheses. 
                                                 
14 iSPRD captures the differences (spread) between LIBOR and the Bank of England Base rate. A lower spread indicates higher capital 
liquidity or availability of low-cost capital. On the contrary, dCRDT captures availability of credit. A higher value indicates higher capital 
liquidity. 
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Sample selection bias explains results in prior studies 
In this section, we focus on explaining the Palepu (1986) finding²a negative relationship 
between SIZE and TALI²which is supported by Brar et al. (2009). Palepu (1986) uses a sample of 
163 targets (between 1971 and 1979) and a sample of 256 non-targets (all drawn from 1979). Firm 
size increases naturally over time, partly driven by inflation. By not accounting for inflation amongst 
RWKHUIDFWRUV3DOHSXWKHUHIRUHFRPSDUHV³VPDOOHU´ILUPVWDUJHWVIURPDQHDUOLHUSHULRG
WR WR³ODUJHU´ firms (targets from D ODWHUSHULRG+HQFH3DOHSX¶V  ILQGLQJRID
negative SIZE±TALI UHODWLRQLVSDUWO\GULYHQE\WKLVVDPSOLQJELDV:HUHSOLFDWH3DOHSX¶VVDPSOLQJ
strategy15 in model 1 of Table 6 and obtain a similar result i.e., a negative relationship between SIZE 
and TALI.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Brar et al. (2009) use a European sample of 294 targets and 722 non-targets. Their sampling is 
VOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWIURP3DOHSX¶V, as their targets and non-targets are drawn from different years 
between 1992 and 2003. Brar et al. (2009) uses the number of targets in each year to derive weights 
which determine the number of non-targets to match to their sample in each year. We argue that Brar 
et al. (2009) introduce sampling bias in their analysis by limiting their sample to firms with market 
capitalisation of at least $100 million. We replicate the Brar et al. (2009) sampling procedure using 
our data. In the first instance (model 2 of Table 6), we do not limit our analysis to large firms (market 
capitalisation of at least $100 million). In model 3, we impose this SIZE restriction. As expected, we 
find that SIZE is positively related to TALI in model 2 (p-value of 0.001) and negatively related to 
TALI in model 3 (p-value of 0.000).  
The matching procedure does not appear to make a significant difference to our findings. Our 
main results in Tables 3 and 4 are based on a full sample (panel) of live and dead firms. We find that 
we can replicate our results using two alternative matching procedures frequently used in the literature. 
Firstly, we use a random matching procedure where we randomly select an equal number of non-
targets to match to the targets in our sample (see models 4 and 5). Secondly, as in models 6 and 7, we 
apply a propensity score matching (PSM) procedure where we select non-targets that are closest to our 
targets in terms of firm characteristics including ROCE, SGW, LIQ, LEV, AGE, LCIN, LCMT, LCDC 
and BLOC (see Table 1).16  
                                                 
15 That is, we use targets from the period 1987-2016 an match these with non-targets from 2016. 
16
 We exclude other firm characteristics in Table 1 in order to satisfy the balancing property of PSM. 
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Unlike random matching, PSM allows us to directly control for observable differences in firm 
characteristics between targets (treated group) and non-targets (control group) prior to assessing the 
relationship between SIZE and TALI (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 2001). In our analyses, we 
find that all treated observations are ³on support´ with no observations ³off support´ indicating a 
significant overlap in (or matching of) propensity scores for the treated and control groups. Our PSM 
achieves low bias across all variables, with a mean (median) percentage of bias of 2% (2.1%). Our 
YDOXHVRI5XELQ¶V%DQG5XELQ¶V5DUH0 and 0.72, respectively, indicating that our samples are 
sufficiently balanced (Rubin, 2011). We employ pair matching (one-to-one matching without 
replacement) and nearest-neighbour (30 and 50) matching algorithms to select observations for 
inclusion in our regression analysis. The results from these different algorithms are qualitatively 
similar. Hence, for brevity, we only report the results from the former. The results from models 5 and 
7 suggest that the inverse U-shape relationship which we hypothesise (H1), is robust to the choice of 
matching procedure. 
 
An augmented prediction model achieves better out-of-sample performance 
The analysis is extended here by evaluating whether these new hypotheses can be used to 
improve the performance of prior prediction models. This is assessed by comparing a null model 
(which uses only firm size and control variables as inputs) versus a new model (which uses SIZE, SIZE 
squared, capital liquidity, market growth, the product of SIZE and capital liquidity and control 
variables). The performance of the null model (M1) versus the new model (M2) is evaluated using 
standard Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve analysis. Here, the area under the ROC curve 
(AUC) for M1 and M2 is computed and the statistical significance of the difference in AUC is assessed 
using the DeLong et al. (1988) methodology.17 Several pseudo R-squares for the two models are also 
computed and analysed. The results are presented in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The AUC of the null model (M1) is 59.79 percent while that of the new model (m2) is 65.42 
percent. The difference in AUC of 5.63 percentage points is statistically significant (p-value of 0.000). 
Six (6) different pseudo R-VTXDUHVIRUWKHWZRGLIIHUHQWPRGHOVLQFOXGLQJ0F)DGGHQ¶V0F)DGGHQ¶V
$GMXVWHG0D[LPXP/LNHOLKRRG0F.HOYH\DQG=DYRLQD¶V&UDJJ	8KOHU¶VDQGILQDOO\(IURQ¶V5-
squares, are computed. In all six (6) cases, the pseudo R square of the new model (M2) is at least 
                                                 
17 AUC comparisons are based on the non-parametric method discussed in DeLong et al. (1988). A model whose ROC curve equal to 
the diagonal line in Figure 1 (i.e., AUC = 0.50) has a predictive ability akin to a random guess. The bigger the differential between a 
PRGHO¶V52&FXUYHDQGWKHGLDJRQDOOLQHLHWKHODUJHULWV$8&WKHKLJKHULVLWVSUHGLFWLYHability. A perfect model has an AUC of 
1. 
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double that of the null model (M1). Together this provides evidence that the new hypotheses increase 
WKHPRGHO¶VDELOLW\WRFRUUHFWO\FODVVLI\WDUJHWVDQGQRQ-targets. While these pseudo R-squares appear 
low, they are generally consistent with the results of prior studies (Powell and Yawson, 2007; Tunyi 
et al., 2019). 
)LQDOO\ ERWK PRGHOV¶ DELOLW\ WR SUHGLFW WDUJHWV LQ D UHDO-life setting (i.e., out of sample) are 
directly tested following the procedure in Danbolt et al. (2016). To achieve this, model parameters 
computed in one period are used to estimate TALI in the next period (out-of-sample). That is, data from ଴ܶ (i.e., 1987) to ௡ܶ (e.g., 1996) is used to develop model parameters which are then used to estimate 
ILUPV¶TALI in ௡ܶାଵ  (i.e., 1997). All firms in ௡ܶାଵ  (i.e., 1997) are then ranked by their TALI and the 
20 percent of firms with the highest TALI are included in the portfolio of predicted targets. This process 
is replicated over the 20-year period (1997 to 2016), always using ܶ ଴ (1987) as a starting point.18 Model 
performance is evaluated as the percentage of actual targets in the portfolio of predicted targets (i.e., 
target portfolio concentration) in each year and over the 20 years.  
The new model achieves an average target concentration of 7.7 percent per year while the null 
model achieves a lower average target concentration of 6.5 percent per year over the 20-year period. 
The difference in mean (target concentration) is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.024. The 
null model only outperforms the new model in 4 (2003, 2011, 2012 and 2016) out of 20 years. This 
provides further evidence of the relevance of the new hypotheses to TALI modelling. It is worth noting 
that an augmented model that only incorporates H1 i.e., includes SIZEsq, also performs considerably 
better than the null model. It achieves a target concentration of 7.9 percent and similarly outperforms 
the null model in 16 out of 20 years. The difference in mean (predictions) between this augmented 
model and the null is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.002. The out-of-sample performance 
results for the null, augmented and new models are summarised in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Additional analyses and robustness checks 
Throughout the study, robustness has been ensured by exploring different variable definitions 
and model specifications. For example, in untabulated results, market capitalisation is used as an 
alternative measure of firm size with results remaining robust. Also, quartiles are used as an alternative 
to quintiles when deriving subsamples in Tables 3 and 4, with results remaining robust. We have 
explored alternative definitions of our control variables, such as the use of ROA (defined as net profit 
to total asset ratio) in place of ROCE, amongst others, and the main results generally remain robust. 
                                                 
18 In the next year, for example, data from 1988 to 1997 is used to develop model parameters. These parameters are then used to estimate 
takeover likelihood for firms in 1998.  
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We have also explored whether the results are robust across different time periods (i.e., 1987±1996, 
1997±2006, and 2007±2016) and found this to be the case. 
In this section, we present results for two additional tests we have conducted to strengthen our 
findings. Our first test considers an alternative measure of market conditions²market intensity²and 
the second test explores whether our results are robust to endogeneity issues. 
Hajbaba and Donelly (2013) suggest that takeover profitability increases with market (M&A) 
intensity (MrktIntensity) which they measure as the natural log of the number of acquisitions in the 12 
months prior to the year of acquisition. They define HOT (COLD) periods as periods when 
MrktIntensity is greater (less) than the median for the study period. We complement Hajbaba and 
Donelly (2013) by exploring whether MrktIntensity (as a measure of market conditions) explains TALI 
and moderates the relation between SIZE and TALI. The correlation between HOT (or MrktIntensity), 
dMKT and iSPRD are low, suggesting that these variables capture different elements of market 
conditions. The current study has focused on dMKT and iSPRD, but here, it is shown that the results 
are broadly consistent with alternative measures of market conditions (i.e., HOT or MrktIntensity). We 
find that TALI increases with MrktIntensity (model 3) and HOT (model 4). Consistent with H2 and 
H3, we also find that comparatively larger firms are acquired during HOT periods (model 5). Finally, 
as shown in models 1 and 2, our main results (H1) are robust across HOT and COLD periods. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Our main results are also susceptible to endogeneity issues. Our use of the full sample of all live 
and dead firms reduces exposure to sample selection and self-selection bias. We have also used an 
extensive set of control variables and have controlled for industry and year fixed effects, partly 
addressing the issue of omitted variable bias. To partly address reverse causality or simultaneity bias, 
we have lagged our independent variables by one year (see equation 1). However, SIZE and other 
financial (control) variables are endogenous covariates which may bias the coefficients and standard 
errors of our regressions. In essence, the relation between SIZE and TALI may capture the relation 
between a set of underlying drivers of SIZE (i.e., our control variables) and TALI. To address this 
source of endogeneity in our non-linear (i.e., logit model), we follow Hasan and Cheung (2018) and 
implement a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) approach. Using this approach, we purge SIZE of its 
other drivers (i.e., endogenous covariates), and extract the component of SIZE which is unrelated to 
these other variables. Here, we first identify a suitable instrument for firm size.19 In our case, we use 
the average size of the other ILUPV LQ D ILUP¶V WZR GLJLW 6,& FRGH LQGXVWU\ LQ HDFK \HDU DV DQ
                                                 
19 We conduct a number of tests for relevance and overidentification to confirm this. 
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instrument for firm size (SIZE).  We then regress SIZE on its instrument and all other control variables 
LQ7DEOH:HH[WUDFWWKHUHVLGXDOIURPWKLVHTXDWLRQDQGXVHLWDVD³FOHDQ´PHDVXre of SIZE, i.e., the 
portion of SIZE which is unexplained by all other covariates. We term this residual SIZE (rSIZE). We 
run all our main analysis again, using rSIZE. Our results are presented in the Appendix (Table 1A). 
Our main results in Tables 3 and 4 remain robust. However, as shown in panel B of Table 1A, when 
using this more stringent measure of SIZE, we find that the interaction effect documented in Table 5 
is significant for market growth (H3) but not for capital liquidity (H2). 
 
5.0 Summary and conclusion 
This study explores (1) the relation between target firm size (SIZE) and takeover likelihood 
(TALI) and (2) how prevailing market conditions, specifically capital liquidity and market growth, 
VKDSHVDQDFTXLUHU¶VFKRLFHRIWDUJHWILUPVL]H,Wemploys data from a UK panel of 34,661 firm-year 
observations drawn from 3,105 firms and 1,396 M&A deals over a 30-year period (1987-2016). About 
30 percent of the M&A deals involve cross-border acquirers from 48 distinct countries (with 10 percent 
of deals from US acquirers), making the results potentially generalisable to contexts beyond the UK. 
Among other things, the study responds to calls for further research into factors moderating a 
ILUP¶V DFTXLVLWLRQ OLNHOLKRRG. The findings confirm assertions that acquirers seek comparatively 
smaller targets but show that this does not justify the widely held view that TALI decreases with target 
firm size (SIZE). The empirical evidence in support of this misconception appears to suffer from 
sample-selection bias, specifically, the truncation of samples by excluding small firms and the use of 
non-random sampling strategies. When a representative sample of firms is considered, mid-size firms 
appear to be more vulnerable to acquisitions. That is, TALI increases with SIZE until a threshold after 
which it declines as SIZE increases. While small firms are affordable, their acquisition, perhaps, does 
not allow acquirers to fully realise some of the documented motives or drivers of takeovers such as 
economies of scale, managerial hubris, market power and empire-building. The largest firms, 
meanwhile, are shielded from acquisitions due to the prohibitive transaction costs, resource constraints 
and the limited number of viable acquirers. Our results lend support for potential value-destroying 
motives in M&As (managerial hubris, manager utility maximisation, and empire building) and the 
finding that, on average, acquirers experience negative abnormal announcement returns during M&As. 
Future research might thus directly explore the extent to which SIZE captures different value-
destroying motives in M&A. 
The results reveal that tKHDFTXLUHU¶V choice of target firm size appears to be shaped, in part, by 
prevailing market conditions. That is, comparatively larger targets are more likely to be acquired when 
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market conditions are good. This highlights the important role of outside market conditions on firm 
acquisition decisions. This finding has implications for policy-makers, as the evidence suggests that 
an outcome of monetary policies (i.e., a reduction in interest rates to increase money supply and the 
availability of credit) shapes firm M&A decisions, specifically, the choice of target firm size. Indeed, 
positive market conditions (e.g., through improvements in capital liquidity or increased availability of 
credit) encourages acquirers to pursue larger targets. This may lead to a more active market for 
corporate control, hence, improved economic outcomes (e.g., efficient allocation of capital, 
employment and output).  
Finally, the study also has implications for takeover prediction modelling (by researchers and 
practitioners) for investment purposes. Due to the substantial returns to takeover targets, several prior 
studies seek to explore the extent to which prediction models can form the basis of a profitable 
investment strategy. The findings reveal that the newly documented relation between target firm size, 
market conditions and TALI can inform the development of an improved TALI prediction model in a 
practical setting. The improvement arises from recognising the non-linear nature of the SIZE±TALI 
relationship, as well as accounting for the interaction effect between SIZE and market conditions when 
modelling TALI. Future studies can explore whether these documented improvements in TALI models 
translate to positive abnormal returns net of costs, when these models are used in an investment setting.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: ROC curve analysis and model performance statistics 
 
 
Pseudo R-squares 
M1 (Null) 
 
M2 (New) 
 
Difference  
(p-value) 
McFadden's R2 0.017 0.038 
 
Maximum Likelihood R2 0.007 0.015 
 
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2 0.079 0.195 
 
McFadden's Adj R2 0.013 0.033 
 
Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.020 0.045 
 
Efron's R2 0.006 0.014 
 
ROC Area 
 
0.5979 
 
0.6542 
 
0.0563*** 
 (0.000) 
OBS. 24308 24308 
  
Notes: The figure presents ROC curves for New and Null models. The area under the curves (AUC) captures 
WKHPRGHOV¶FODVVLILFDWLRQDELOLW\$OWHUQDWLYHPHDVXUHVRISVHXGR5-squares are presented for the null and new 
models. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Figure 2: Out-of-sample predictive ability of the null versus the new model 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure presents results for out-of-sample predictions made by the models (New versus 
Null) over a 20-year period (1997-2016). Target portfolio concentration measures the number of 
true-positives as a percentage of total predictions made by the New and Null models.  
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Table 1: Control variables for modelling takeover likelihood (TALI) 
Control variable, rationale and 
reference 
Variable definition and computation and expected sign 
Life cycle: Firm lifecycle theory 
explains firm entry and exit from 
an industry. Shake-out and 
declining phases are 
characterised by firms leaving 
the industry e.g., through 
takeovers (Dickinson 2011; 
Hasan and Cheung, 2018). 
9 LCIN (+/±) is an indicator variable which identifies firms in 
the introductory stage of their lifecycle. It takes a value of 1 
LI D ILUP¶V FDVK IORZ IURP RSHUDWLQJ DFWLYLWLHV &)2 LV
negative (i.e., CFO<0), its cash flow from investing 
activities (CFI) is negative (i.e., CFI<0) and its cash flows 
from financing activities (CFF) is positive (i.e., CFF>0).  
9 LCGR (+/±) identifies firms in the growth stage. It takes a 
value of 1 if CFO>0, CFI<0 and CFF>0.  
9 LCMT (+/±) identifies firms in the maturity stage. It takes a 
value of 1 if CFO>0, CFI<0 and CFF>0). 
9 LCDC (+/±) identifies firms in the decline stage. It takes a 
value of 1 if CFO<0 and CFI>0. 
9 LCSH (+) identifies firms in the shake-out stage. It identifies 
all observations not classified under the any of the other four 
stages. 
Inefficient management: TALI 
GHFUHDVHVDVDILUP¶V
performance increases (Palepu, 
1986; Powell 2001). 
9 ROCE (±) is the ratio of EBIT to total capital employed.  
9 ADAR (±) (average daily abnormal returns) is the average 
daily abnormal return computed using the capital asset 
pricing model. 
Undervaluation: TALI 
increases with the level of firm 
undervaluation 
9 TBQ (±) 7RELQ¶V 4 LV HVWLPDWHG DV WKH VXP RI WKH ERRN
value of debt (i.e., the difference between the book value of 
assets and the book value of equity) and the market value of 
equity, scaled by the book value of assets. 
Growth-resource mismatch: 
Low-growth-resource-rich firms 
as well as high-growth-resource-
poor firms have a high TALI 
(Palepu, 1986; Danbolt et al., 
2016). 
9 SGR (+/±) (sales growth) is the percentage change in total 
revenues from the previous period.  
9 LIQ (+/±) (liquidity) is the ratio of cash and short-term 
investments to total assets.  
9 LEV (+/±) (leverage) LVWKHILUP¶VGHEWWRHTXLW\UDWLR 
9 GRDY (+/±) (growth-resource dummy) takes a value of 1 
ZKHQ WKHUH LV D PLVPDWFK EHWZHHQ D ILUP¶V JURZWK
opportunities and its resources, and a value of 0 otherwise. 
Free cash flow: TALI increases 
ZLWKDILUP¶VOHYHORIIUHHFDVK
flow (Danbolt et al., 2016). 
9 FCF (+) is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow 
minus capital investments) to total assets.   
Tangible assets: TALI increases 
with the proportion of tangible 
DVVHWVLQDILUP¶VWRWDODVVHW
portfolio (Ambrose and 
Megginson, 1992; Danbolt et al., 
2016). 
9 TANG (+) (tangible assets) is the ratio of tangible assets 
(property, plant and equipment) to total assets.   
Firm age: TALI decreases with 
firm age (Danbolt et al., 2016). 
9 AGE (±) is the natural log number of years since 
incorporation. 
Block holders: TALI increases 
with the presence of large 
shareholders (Cremers et al., 
2009; Danbolt et al., 2016). 
9 BLOC  EORFNKROGHU¶VGXPP\ WDNHVDYDOXHRI LID
firm has a significant shareholder (5 percent or more 
shareholding) in the 90days to June of each year. 
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Price Momentum: Active 
trading potential signals to 
arrival of takeover bids (Brar et 
al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016). 
9 MOM (+) (momentum) is the t-statistic of a trend line slope 
fitted to logged daily stock prices over the 90 trading days to 
June each year. 
Trading Volume: High trading 
volume signals the arrival of 
potential takeover bids (Brar et 
al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016). 
9 TVOL (+) (trading volume) is the proportion of outstanding 
shares traded over the 90 days to June each year. 
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Table 2: Ratio of acquirer to target size (relative size) 
 
 
Market Capitalisation Total Assets 
All deals 
 
2.48 1.23 
Method of Payment Cash 6.57 6.65 
 Non-cash 2.63 1.72 
 Stock 2.39 1.17 
 Non-stock 3.87 5.02 
Origin of the acquirer Cross border 5.07 5.63 
 Domestic 3.19 2.66 
Attitude of the acquirer Friendly 3.72 4.61 
 Hostile 2.41 1.98 
Deal status Completed 3.81 4.61 
 Failed 1.85 1.87 
Public status of acquirer Public 3.32 3.01 
 Private - 4.68 
 
Notes: This table presents the median of the relative size of acquirers to targets (size of acquirers divided by size of targets). 
Market capitalisation and total assets are used as proxies for firm size. 
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Table 3: Target size and takeover likelihood (TALI) across different size subsamples 
 ALL Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 ALL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
SIZE 0.003*** 0.020*** 0.027*** -0.003 -0.014* -0.012***  
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.683) (0.062) (0.000)  
Q1       -0.045*** 
       (0.000) 
Q2       -0.013*** 
       (0.002) 
Q4       0.005 
       (0.276) 
Q5       -0.011** 
       (0.013) 
LCGR 0.027 0.296*** 0.058 -0.006 0.068 0.030 0.027 
 (0.304) (0.000) (0.315) (0.933) (0.309) (0.596) (0.308) 
LCMT 0.035** 0.299*** 0.085** -0.010 0.063 -0.056** 0.037** 
 (0.019) (0.000) (0.016) (0.751) (0.211) (0.043) (0.012) 
LCSH 0.026* 0.283*** 0.060* -0.004 0.053 -0.053** 0.027** 
 (0.065) (0.000) (0.074) (0.893) (0.273) (0.037) (0.050) 
LCDC 0.010 0.265*** 0.046 -0.008 0.030 -0.061** 0.011 
 (0.486) (0.000) (0.162) (0.777) (0.537) (0.046) (0.413) 
ROCE 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.352) (0.453) (0.749) (0.743) (0.824) (0.758) (0.561) 
AAR -1.609*** 0.100 -1.108 0.749 -4.666*** -5.380*** -1.431** 
 (0.007) (0.878) (0.299) (0.596) (0.006) (0.002) (0.016) 
TBQ -0.005*** 0.002*** -0.003 -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.005 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.260) (0.002) (0.006) (0.392) (0.005) 
SGW -0.002 -0.000 -0.008** -0.002 0.000 -0.019 -0.003 
 (0.195) (0.935) (0.043) (0.513) (0.926) (0.304) (0.166) 
LIQ -0.010 -0.009 0.015 -0.032 0.006 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.350) (0.419) (0.406) (0.231) (0.857) (0.985) (0.596) 
LEV 0.004 -0.009 -0.011 0.019 0.056** -0.019 0.011 
 (0.683) (0.534) (0.655) (0.391) (0.014) (0.377) (0.215) 
GRD -0.000 0.002 0.011 -0.005 -0.012 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.943) (0.778) (0.160) (0.612) (0.298) (0.659) (0.913) 
FCF 0.037*** 0.002 0.014 0.041 0.035 0.037 0.031** 
 (0.003) (0.880) (0.548) (0.322) (0.519) (0.546) (0.019) 
TANG 0.019*** -0.015 -0.001 -0.000 0.026 0.043*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.223) (0.921) (0.984) (0.116) (0.008) (0.007) 
AGE -0.010*** -0.004* -0.008** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.008* -0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.094) (0.022) (0.000) (0.003) (0.052) (0.000) 
BLOC -0.008 -0.004 -0.023* -0.039*** 0.009 0.035** -0.012* 
 (0.204) (0.604) (0.088) (0.010) (0.577) (0.031) (0.063) 
MOM -0.001 0.003* 0.001 -0.001 -0.010*** 0.005 -0.001 
 (0.694) (0.084) (0.670) (0.649) (0.005) (0.175) (0.590) 
TVOL -0.002 0.000 0.006** -0.028** -0.016* -0.007 -0.000 
 (0.810) (0.701) (0.013) (0.014) (0.064) (0.198) (0.985) 
Observations 21,991 4,150 4,736 4,776 4,471 3,839 21,991 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Notes: The table presents logit regression results (marginal effects) for a takeover likelihood (TALI) model (see equations 
1 and 2). The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm receives a takeover bid in period t 
and a value of 0, otherwise. The main independent variables are the natural log of total assets (SIZE) and a dummy which 
captures membership in the smallest SIZE quintile (Q1) and a dummy which captures membership in the largest SIZE 
quintile (Q5). All control variables are discussed in Table 1. Models control for industry (Ind) and year fixed effects (FE). 
The independent and control variables are lagged by one year. Model 1 uses the full dataset. In models 2 to 6, the dataset 
is split into 5 quintiles (subsamples) of firm size, with Q1 representing the smallest 20 percent of firms and Q5, the largest 
20 percent of firms. The same logit regression as in (1) is run for each subsample. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Target size and takeover likelihood (TALI) 
 Q1&Q2 Q3,Q4&Q5 Mid-size Squared Centred 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SIZE 0.023*** -0.005***  0.150*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZEsq    -0.004*** -0.004*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
MSDY   0.024***   
   (0.000)   
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,886 13,105 21,991 21,991 21,991 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: The table presents logit regression results (marginal effects) for a takeover likelihood (TALI) model (see equations 
1 and 2). The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm receives a takeover bid in period t 
and a value of 0, otherwise. The main independent variables are the natural log of total assets (SIZE), the square of SIZE 
(SIZEsq) and a mid-size dummy (MSDY) which captures membership in SIZE quartiles 2 and 3. The control variables 
(suppressed for brevity) include all variables in Table 1. Models also control for industry and year fixed effects (FE). The 
independent and control variables are lagged by one year. Q1 to Q5 represent 5 quintiles of firm size, with Q1 representing 
the smallest 20 percent of firms and Q5, the largest 20 percent of firms. Model 1 conducts the regression using the smallest 
40 percent of firms (Q1 and Q2), while model 2 conducts the regression using the largest 60 percent of firms (Q3 to Q5). 
In models 4 and 5, the square of firm size (SIZEsq) is added to the model. In model 5, SIZE and SIZEsq are centred about 
their means. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Target size, market conditions and takeover likelihood (TALI) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
iSPRD -0.005**      
 (0.034)      
dCRDT  0.167***     
  (0.000)     
dMKT   0.046***    
   (0.000)    
iSPRDdummy    -0.009***   
    (0.003)   
iSPRDdummy*SIZE    -0.003**   
    (0.046)   
dCRDTdummy     -0.003  
     (0.451)  
dCRDTdummy*SIZE     0.003**  
     (0.016)  
dMKTdummy      0.004 
      (0.186) 
dMKTdummy*SIZE      0.003** 
      (0.012) 
SIZE 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 21,991 21,991 20,793 21,991 21,991 21,991 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: The table presents logit regression (marginal effects) results for a takeover likelihood (TALI) model (see equations 
1 and 2). The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm receives a takeover bid in period t 
and a value of 0, otherwise. The main independent variables are measures of capital liquidity (iSPRD, dCRDT 
iSPRDdummy dCRDTdummy), market growth (dMKT, dMKTdummy) and target firm size (SIZE). iSPRD is the spread 
between LIBOR and the Bank of England base rate. dMKT in each year is computed as the yearly return on the FTSE all 
share index. dCRDT is computed as the percentage change in the level of credit (from all sectors to non-financial sector) 
to gross domestic product.  iSPRDdummy takes a value of 0 if iSPRD reduces by at least 5 percent from one year to the 
next, and a value of 1 otherwise. dCRDTdummy takes a value of 1 if dCRDT increases by at least 5 percent from one year 
to the next and a value of 0, otherwise. dMKTdummy takes a value of 1 if dMKT increases by at least 5 percent from one 
year to the next and value of 0, otherwise. dCRDTdummy*SIZE, dMKTdummy*SIZE and iSPRDdummy*SIZE captures 
interaction effects between the respective variables. The marginal effects for the interaction are computed based on the 
difference between the average marginal effects for SIZE evaluated in turn for high and low market conditions. The control 
variables (suppressed for brevity) include all variables in Table 1. Models also control for industry and year fixed effects 
(FE).  The independent and control variables are lagged by one year. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Target size and takeover likelihood under alternative sampling strategies 
 
 Palepu Brar et al. Random PSM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
SIZE -0.040*** 0.018*** -0.028*** 0.012** 0.714*** 0.016** 0.767*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) 
SIZEsq     -0.019***  -0.020*** 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs 1,707 3,483 1,902 2,931 2,931 2,234 2,234 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: The table presents logit regression results (marginal effects) for a takeover likelihood (TALI) model (see equations 
1 and 2) under alternative sampling strategies. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if a 
firm receives a takeover bid in period t and a value of 0, otherwise. The main independent variables are the natural log of 
total assets (SIZE) and the square of SIZE (SIZEsq). The control variables (suppressed for brevity) include all variables in 
Table 1. Models also control for industry and year fixed effects (FE). The independent and control variables are lagged by 
one year. Model 1 presents results when the Palepu (1986) sampling approach is adopted.  Model 2 presents results when 
the Brar et al. (2009) sampling methodology is adopted but the sample is not constraint to firms with a market capitalisation 
of at least $100 million. Model 3 is similar to 2, but restricts the sample to firms with market capitalisation of at least $100 
million. Models 4 and 5 show results when a random 1-to-1 (i.e., one target to one non-target) matching approach is 
adopted. Models 6 and 7 show results under propensity score matching (PSM). Here, propensity scores are derived using 
the control variables in Table 1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 32 
 
Table 7: Target size, takeover likelihood and market intensity 
 HOT COLD ALL ALL ALL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SIZE 0.194*** 0.059*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZEsq -0.005*** -0.001***    
 (0.000) (0.002)    
MrktIntensity   0.043***   
   (0.000)   
HOT    0.029*** 0.025*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
HOT*SIZE     0.004*** 
     (0.006) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 15,067 6,924 21,991 21,991 21,991 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: The table presents logit regression (marginal effects) results for a takeover likelihood (TALI) model (see equations 
1 and 2). The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm receives a takeover bid in period t 
and a value of 0, otherwise. The main independent variables are measures of market intensity (MrktIntensity, HOT) and 
target firm size (SIZE, SIZEsq). MrktIntensity is the natural log of the number of acquisitions in the 12 months prior to the 
year of acquisition. HOT (COLD) periods as periods when MrktIntensity is greater(less) than the median for the study 
period. HOT (COLD) periods are years when MrktIntensity is greater(less) than the median for the study period. HOT is 
an indicator variable denoting high MrktIntensity. HOT*SIZE captures the interaction effect between the respective 
variables. The control variables (suppressed for brevity) include all variables in Table 1. Models also control for industry 
and year fixed effects (FE).  The independent and control variables are lagged by one year. Model 1(2) presents results 
when the analysis is conducted for a subsample of HOT (COLD) years only. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 
Table 1A: Takeover likelihood and residual (excess) target firm size 
Panel A: A re-estimation of Table 3 results with an alternative measure of firm size 
 ALL Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
rSIZE 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.027* -0.015 -0.003 -0.007* 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.062) (0.310) (0.818) (0.066) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21,965 4,297 4,377 4,395 4,392 4,370 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Panel B: A re-estimation of Tables 4 and 5 results with an alternative measure of firm size 
 Q1&Q2 Q3-Q5 ALL ALL ALL ALL 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
rSIZE 0.019*** -0.003*  0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.086)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
rSIZEsq    -0.004***   
    (0.000)   
iSPRDdummy     -0.009***  
     (0.004)  
iSPRDdummy*rSIZE     0.001  
     (0.810)  
rMSDY   0.017***    
   (0.000)    
dMKTdummy      0.004 
      (0.199) 
dMKTdummy *rSIZE      0.004*** 
      (0.004) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,794 13,171 21,991 21,965 21,965 21,965 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: The table presents a re-estimation of the results from Tables 3, 4 and 5, using an alternative measure of firm size 
(residual size, rSIZE). rSIZE is a component of SIZE which is unrelated to these other variables. It is the residual obtained 
by regressing SIZE QDWXUDOORJRIWRWDODVVHWVRQLWVLQVWUXPHQWWKHDYHUDJHVL]HRIILUPVLQDILUP¶VWZRGLJLW6,&FRGH
industry in each year) and all other control variables in Table 1. The dependent variable in all models (panels A and B) is 
a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm receives a takeover bid in period t and a value of 0, otherwise. The main 
independent variables are measures of firm size (rSIZE, rMSDY), capital liquidity (iSPRD, iSPRDdummy), market growth 
(dMKT, dMKTdummy) and their interactions. See Tables 3, 4 and 5 for full descriptions. All control variables are discussed 
in Table 1. Models also control for industry and year fixed effects (FE). The independent and control variables are lagged 
by one year. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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